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Abstract
The presented article attempts to characterize the encryption dynamics of delayed dynamics based block ciphers, designed for the
encryption of binary data. For such encryption algorithms, the encryption process relies on a coupling dynamics with time delay
between different bits in the plaintext (i.e. the “initial” message to be encrypted). Here, the principal dynamics of the encryption
process is examined and the Hammingdistance is used to quantify the change in ciphertext (i.e. the plaintext after encryption) upon
changing a single bit in the plaintext message or slightly perturbing the key used during encryption. More precisely, the previously
proposed “encryption via delayed dynamics” (in short: EDDy) algorithm as well as its extended version (termed ExEDDy) are
analyzed by means of numerical simulations. As a result it is found that while EDDy exhibits a rather poor perfomance, ExEDDy
performes considerably better and hence constitutes a significant improvement over EDDy. Consequently, the results are contrasted
with those obtained for a block cipher that implements the encryption/decryptiondynamics by means of reversible cellular automata.
Keywords: cryptography, avalanche parameter, delayed dynamics, reversible cellular automata
1. Introduction
Cryptography (Greek: krypto´s = hidden/secret, gra´phein =
writing) is the science of keeping information secure, e.g. for
the purpose of secret communication [1]. In recent years it was
realized that elementary, computer-science or physics moti-
vated systems that exhibit a complex behavior allow for the de-
sign of cryptosystems, i.e. encryption algorithms (also termed
ciphers) and their decryption counterparts. Among those “ap-
plied science” encryption algorithms one can distinguish stream
ciphers that encrypt a given message one bit (or symbol) at a
time [2, 3], and block ciphers that operate on blocks of, say, N
bits [4, 5, 6].
The basic task in cryptography is two-fold: (i) the encryption
process, wherein a plaintext message is scrambled using a cer-
tain cipher and key. The key specifies the precise way a given
plaintext is transformed by means of the cipher. The result of
the encryption procedure is a ciphertext message. (ii) the de-
cryption process, where the ciphertext is transformed into the
initial plaintext message by use of the corresponding decryp-
tion algorithm and a proper key. Note that, depending on the
precise cryptography-mode, there is a subtle difference regard-
ing the key: in symmetric-key cryptography, where one deals
with a single-key cryptosystem, the same key is used during
encryption/decryption. In public-key cryptography, signifying
a two-key cryptosystem, the encryption key is public and the
decryption key is kept secret. A statement on the security of a
cryptographic method is provided by “Kerckhoffs principle”. It
states that a cryptosystem should be secure if everything about
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the cryptographic method is known, except the key. Here, se-
cure means that it is difficult or even impossible to obtain the
plaintext from the ciphertext. In this regard, a characteristic de-
sirable for any cipher is that a change in plaintext or key, as
tiny as it may be, will result in a notable change in the cipher-
text. More precise, changing one randomly chosen bit in either,
plaintext or key, should invert nearly half of the bits of the ci-
phertext. This avalanche property was suggested by Feistel in
1973 [7].
Subsequently, only symmetric-key block ciphers designed to
process binary plaintext messages will be considered. As re-
gards this, the bulk of the presented article is dedicated to a
scrambling scheme that relies on the paradigm of “encryption
via delayed dynamics” (termed EDDy), see [5], as well as an
extended variant thereof (signified as ExEDDy), see [4]. In Ref.
[5] it was shown, how an exemplary initial state evolves with
time and found that encoded states at different iteration times
of the encryption dynamics are rather uncorrelated. Further,
the effect of a slight modification of the key on the ciphertext
was illustrated for one plaintext message and concluded that a
“nearly” correct guess of the key does not lead to a sufficient
overlap between decoded ciphertext and plaintext upon decryp-
tion so as to guess the initial message. As a weakness of the
method it was mentioned that a change of multiple bits in the
plaintext propagates to the ciphertext as a simple superposition
of changes due to each changed bit. In Ref. [4] the encryption
dynamics was modified to some extend, and it was observed
that a minor change in key leads to rather uncorrelated cipher-
text messages and that a change of multiple bits in plaintext
does not propagate to the ciphertext as a simple superposition
of changes due to each changed bit.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the encryption dynamics for the cryptosystems under
consideration. All three ciphers were used to encode the same N = 16-bit plain-
text message m (leftmost column) for a number of 80 iteration steps (bits with
value 1 are shown as nonfilled squares). (a) Encryption via delayed dynamics
(EDDy) cipher, (b) extended EDDy (i.e. ExEDDy) cipher using the same key
as in (a), and (c) reversible cellular automaton (ReCA) cipher using a randomly
generated 32-bit update rule.
The presented article addresses the question of performance
of the two ciphers using numerical simulations. Basically
speaking, the encryption algorithms are applied to binary plain-
texts of N = 4 . . .2048 bits in length and it is checked whether
they exhibit the avalanche property. Albeit there are more strict
criteria to quantify the security of ciphers, I will solely con-
sider the avalanche property. As it appears, EDDy does not
exhibit the avalanche property. Even worse, it also lacks com-
pleteness. Completeness requires that for every possible key,
every ciphertext bit must depend on all plaintext bits, not only
a proper subset of those. Further, I present clear evidence that
ExEDDy outperforms EDDy. So as to put the arguments along
the plot of the presented article on solid ground, a third, only
recently introduced, cryptosystem based on reversible cellular
automata (referred to as ReCA) as presented in [6] is consid-
ered and the results obtained therein are partly reproduced to
contrast those for (Ex)EDDy. The encryption algorithms con-
sidered here all work in iterative manner. As regards this, Fig.
1 gives a qualitative account of the difference in the respective
encryption dynamics.
Note that only few is known about the performance of re-
versible cellular automata based block ciphers [6] and even less
is known on the performance of delayed dynamics based ci-
phers such as EDDy and ExEDDy. To the best knowledge of the
author, the presented article comprises a first attempt to quan-
tify how well the delayed dynamics based ciphers EDDy and
ExEDDy perform upon encrypting plaintexts of N = 4 . . . 2018
bits in length.
The remainder of the presented article is organized as fol-
lows. In section 2, the considered cryptosystems are introduced
and illustrated in more detail. Section 3 contains the numer-
ical results obtained via simulations for plaintext of different
size and section 4 concludes with a summary. A more elaborate
summary of the presented article is available at the papercore
database [8].
2. Encryption algorithms
Dynamical rules that describe the evolution of simple system
often induce complex behavior with characteristics that are de-
sirable for an encryption scheme [9, 3, 10]. In this regard, the
remainder of this section describes three cryptographic meth-
ods that rely on iterative dynamic procedures, exhibiting com-
plex behavior, used to scramble a binary input message so as to
hide its information content.
2.1. EDDy: encryption via delayed dynamics
Based on the paradigm of delayed dynamics, a block cipher
for encryption of binary data, here termed EDDy (as in “en-
cryption with delayed dynamics”), was proposed [5]. EDDy is
a symmetric-key cryptosystem that works in an iterative manner
and as such it requires the following input: (i) a binary plain-
text message m = s(0), consisting of a sequence of N bits si(0)
(taking values ±1), and (ii) a key K = (P, τ, T ), used during
the encryption/decryption process. The component P signifies
a permutation obtained from the sequence (0, 1, . . . , N − 1), τ
represents a delay-time vector of length N, where τi ∈ [1, τmax]
is an integer delay time associated with bit i, and T denotes the
number of iterations carried out by the encryption algorithm.
Note that the key required by EDDy is rather large: if we aim
to encrypt a N-bit plaintext message and agree to use an in-
tegral data type that requires M-bits in order to represent the
components of P and τ as well as T , then the key has a length
of M(2N + 1) bits (bear in mind that the common C/C++- data
type int has 32 bits). Now, from the point of view of an adver-
sary that plans a cryptographic attack on EDDy, assume τmax
is known. If the attack merely consists in guessing a key, then
there are as much as (N!)(τmax)N possible choices for a pair of
P and τ, as well as a guess for T , left. Hence, the key space of
EDDy is enormous. For comparison: the data encryption stan-
dard (DES) which is restricted to a blocksize of 64 bits employs
a 56 bit key. For fixed N = 64 and τmax = 10, there are as much
as (N!)(τmax)N ≈ 2500 keys for the EDDy scheme.
Based on the ingredients above, the encryption dynamics
read:
si(t) = −sPi (max(0, t − τi)) (1)
Therein, Pi and τi are the ith elements of P and τ, respectively.
One iteration of the cipher consists in updating each bit once.
The ciphertext c = s(T ) is obtained when the exact number of
iterations T , predefined in the key, are carried out. Decryption
is performed by using the same key K and applying the reverse
dynamics sk(t) = −su(t+ τu), where Pu = k. So as to facilitate a
proper decryption, the sender needs to communicate a sequence
of at least τmax + 1 successive encoded states, i.e. the “full” ci-
phertext cF, to the receiver. An exemplary encryption procedure
for a plaintext of 8-bit in length is shown in Fig. 2(a). In effect,
the dynamics defined by the updating rule Eq. 1 induces a lin-
ear dynamics. The state of a particular bit, say bit i, is related to
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Figure 2: Illustration of the encryption process for a 8-bit plaintext message
m = [−1, 1,−1, 1,−1, 1,−1,−1] (bits in state 1 are given by nonfilled squares)
and key K = (P, τ, T ) in case of (a) the EDDy cipher, and (b) the ExEDDy
cipher. In the latter figure, plaintext m, ciphertext c and full ciphertext cF are
indicated. Figure (c) shows the encryption process for the ReCA cipher using
plaintext m = [0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0] and key K = (R,T ).
the state of exactly one other bit with integer identifier j = Pi
at some preceding time.
2.2. ExEDDy: extended variant of encryption via delayed dy-
namics
The extended variant of the EDDy cipher uses the same input
information as above, i.e. a binary plaintext message m = s(0)
and a key K = (P, τ, T ). Using the same notation as above, the
ExEDDy cipher reads
si(t + 1) = sPi (max(0, t − τi)) · θ
(∑N−1
i=0
si(t)
)
. (2)
Therein, θ(·) is a step function satisfying
θ(x) =

+1, if x > 0,
−1, if x ≤ 0.
(3)
As opposed to the EDDy scheme, this causes a nonlinear dy-
namics since an arbitrary bit at time step t (explicitly) depends
on all N bits at time step t−1. Fig. 2(b) illustrates an exemplary
encryption procedure for the ExEDDy cipher.
2.3. ReCA: encryption via reversible cellular automata
Cellular automata (CA) are abstract computing models that
work on a discrete space-time background. They exhibit com-
plex dynamics and might be interpreted as discrete structures
that approximate differential equations [11]. As such, CA high-
light the close connection between the realms of computer sci-
ence and physics [12, 13, 14]. Further, there is a possibility
to use CA as cryptosystems for the purpose of data encryption
[2, 6].
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Figure 3: List of the 8 possible configurations si−1(t), si(t), si+1(t) for a radius 1
CA, that might serve as input to the local update rule f . The configurations are
interpreted as 3 digit binary numbers (bits with value 1 are shown as nonfilled
squares) and sorted in decreasing fashion from left to right. The 8 solitary
cells below cell i indicate the state si(t + 1) = f [si−1(t), si(t), si+1(t + 1)]. The
respective 8 bit sequence fully specifies the update rule. In Wolfram’s notation,
the integer representation of the latter sequence is used as a name R for the rule
(here: R = 150, which represents the most simple finite difference variant of
the heat equation in modulo 2 arithmetic [11]).
The most basic CA [13] consist of a circular array s of, say,
N cells that can take values si ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ (0, . . . , N − 1).
The evolution of CA proceeds in discrete time steps t, where
the values of the individual components si(t) are updated syn-
chronously according to a certain local update rule. So as to
evolve state si(t) → si(t + 1), the local update rules f con-
sidered in the presented article take into account the state of
cell i as well as the states of those cells that are located within
a neighborhood of radius r = 2 enclosing i at time t, hence
si(t + 1) = f [si−2(t), . . . , si+2(t)] (note that the array of cells is
circular, i.e. cells 0 and N−1 are adjacent). Considering a neigh-
borhood of radius r, there are an over all number of 22r+1 dif-
ferent input configurations to f . Hence, the local rule for a one-
dimensional radius 2 CA is specified by a 25 = 32-digit binary
number. In turn, there are 232 different CA rules for the speci-
fied setup. A more simple example of a local rule for a r = 1
CA is shown in Fig. 3. Therein, also the name convention for
CA rules is detailed. Note that in general, CA are not time re-
versal symmetric, a feature one would request in order to set up
a convenient dynamics for encryption as well as its reverse dy-
namics for decryption [6]. Nevertheless, such basic CA might
already be used as stream ciphers [2, 14]. It is important to note
that there is a possibility to transform any (non-reversible) rule
into a time reversal invariant rule. For a CA with a binary state
alphabet and r = 2 neighborhood, the recipe to achieve this sim-
ply reads: si(t + 1) = ( f [si−2(t), . . . , si+2(t)] − si(t − 1))mod(2)
[11]. Note that the modified rule is second order in time, i.e. so
as to start the dynamics of the CA one has to provide a configu-
ration s(t = 0) and its predecessor s(−1). The intriguing feature
of time reversal invariance is: a sequence of configurations can
be obtained in reverse order by means of the same rule f [·], by
reversing the last two configurations. In effect, this is the core
idea of encryption via reversible CA (ReCA) [6].
In order to use ReCA for the purpose of data encryption,
one has to supply two ingredients: (i) the input data, where
s(0) = m, and some random initial data (rid) taken as s(−1) so
as to be able to start the ReCA dynamics. (ii) a key that gov-
erns the encryption dynamics, given by an updating rule that
specifies the evolution of the state s(t) → s(t + 1) and a num-
ber T of iteration steps, after which the ciphertext is obtained.
Note that for such a ReCA cipher, the full ciphertext consists
of two sequences: s(T ) which is identified with the ciphertext
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c, and the final encrypted data (fd) s(T + 1). An exemplary en-
cryption process using a ReCA algorithm is illustrated in Fig.
2(c). Decryption using ReCA is particularly simple: upon set-
ting s′(0) = s(T ), s′(−1) = s(T + 1), and using the same key
as during encryption, it will hold that s′(T ) = m. The configu-
ration s′(T + 1) contains the random initial data and as such, it
is not of interest after decryption. However, it might be used as
an additional degree of freedom: upon using a particular key,
a given plaintext message can be scrambled into numerous ci-
phertexts, depending on the random initial data. So as to real-
ize secure communication using this approach, there are some
subtleties concerning the communication of the finial encrypted
data, see Ref. [6]. However, the focus here is on the principal
dynamics of the encryption schemes.
The subsequent section presents the results of the numeri-
cal simulations and attempts to give some more intuition on the
principle dynamics on which the considered encryption algo-
rithms are based.
3. Results
In the presented section, the encryption process, wherein
a plaintext message m is scrambled using a certain cipher F
(either EDDy, ExEDDy or ReCA) and key K, is put under
scrutiny. The result of the encryption procedure is a cipher-
text message c, and the process might be written as c = FK(m).
In order to probe the avalanche criterion (the precise definition
of the avalanche criterion is given below in Subsect. 3.2) for a
given cipher F, a three step procedure is adequate: Obtain a
random key K (valid for F), then (i) generate a random binary
plaintext message, N bits in length, and obtain the correspond-
ing ciphertext c, (ii) flip one bit, say bit mi, of the plaintext
message to obtain a perturbed plaintext m(i) and obtain the cor-
responding ciphertext c(i), (iii) compute the Hammingdistance
dH(c, c(i)) between the two ciphertexts, defined as the number
of differences between the components of c and c(i). For binary
sequences c and c(i) of N bit length and using Boolean notation,
the Hammingdistance may be written as
dH(c, c(i)) = #1(c ⊕ c(i)). (4)
Therein ⊕ denotes the logical xor-operation, and #1(c) signifies
the number of occurrences of the digit 1 in the binary represen-
tation of c.
For a given plaintext of length N, the results are then av-
eraged over different plaintexts m and keys K. In this regard,
for N ≤ 10 and for a particular key, it is feasible to consider
the full input alphabet ZN2 consisting of 2
N distinct plaintext
messages. Here, a number of 200 different keys was taken
into account in order to compute averages 〈dH(c, c(i))〉m,K . For
N > 10, tuple consisting of a plaintext and a key were sampled
uniformly at random from among all possible choices. Further,
the “equiprobable ensemble”, featuring binary messages with
probability p = 1/2 for bits in state 1, was considered. In this
case, a number of 400 plaintext/key pairs was used so as to
compute averages.
In the remainder of the presented section, the dynamics of
the encryption prosess is considered. In this respect, in the first
subsection evidence is collected on whether plaintext and ci-
phertext blocks, obtainded via the different encryption dynam-
ics, are statistically independent. For this purpose, a n-block
frequency test (note that the frequency test carried out above
resembles the monobit frequency test suggested by NIST [15]
to check the randomness of binary sequences. Here, instead of
monobits, bytes are considered.) is employed, a compression
test is performed, and a measure of (structural) complexity for
sequences of encoded states is considered. The respective sub-
section is closed by a simple graphical correlation analysis re-
garding successive encoded states. The subsequent subsection
explains and quantifies the avalanche parameter for the consid-
ered ciphers. Therefore, the evolution of the plaintext is con-
sidered and the stationary behavior of the avalanche parameter
is examined. The presented section concludes with a note on
completeness for the different encryption schemes.
3.1. Dynamics of the encryption processes for the considered
ciphers
A given cryptosystem provides perfect secrecy, if the plain-
text and ciphertext blocks processed by the cipher are statisti-
cally independent [1]. Here, the principle dynamics of the en-
cryption process is considered by monitoring the evolution of
plaintext messages during the encryption process. Therein, the
aim of the presented subsection is to employ various tests on
the three ciphers introduced above, to check if the sequence of
encoded configurations exhibits obvious statistical regularities.
To perform the necessary tests, a large number of up to T ≈ 104
iteration steps are used with the respective ciphers. Albeit this
might be infeasible for any practical cryptographic application,
it is nevertheless useful as far as the principle dynamics of the
algorithms is considered. Further, so as to contrast the results on
the three ciphers above, a 1d CA with r = 1 neighborhood that
implements Wolfram rule 30 (denoted as R30) is considered.
R30 generates effectively random bit sequences and might be
used as a stream cipher for cryptographic purposes, see Refs.
[2, 14]. As such, it has already passed a series of statistical tests
[16] and is solely considered for the purpose of comparison.
n-block frequency test for configurations during encryption. At
first, the statistics for a sequence s(t) of encrypted binary con-
figurations, obtained during the encryption process, is put under
scrutiny. The basic question is whether the resulting statistics is
compatible with that for sequences of effectively random con-
figurations. A proper tool to check this is a n-block frequency
test. This test can be cast into the following three step proce-
dure: (i) slice the N bit input configuration s(t) for a given step t
into a number of M = ⌊N/n⌋ n-bit blocks {bi}Mi=1, and discard all
remaining bits. Then, follow the “evolution” of the input con-
figuration up to t0 +∆t iteration steps, where the configurations
obtained during the first t0 = N iteration steps are skipped (the
value of t0 is picked rather arbitrarily, it is ment to eliminate
possible effects of the initial “short-time” dynamics). Repre-
sent each n-bit block bi by means of its integer decimal value
Id[bi] ∈ (0, . . . , 2n −1), and accumulate the resulting integers in
a histogram {hi} having 2n bins with id i ∈ (0, . . . , 2n − 1). The
bins then contain the observed frequencies hi associated to the
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Figure 4: Result of the n-block frequency analysis. The pdf shows the dis-
tribution of the ration of frequencies {hi/ei}2
n−1
i=0 for n = 8. The distributions
resulting from ExEDDy, ReCA and R30 dynamics compare well to a Gaussian
distribution with mean µ = 0.999(2) and width σ = 0.047(1) (obtained from a
fit to the ReCA data and illustrated by the dashed line). This already leads to
expect that the histogram of observed frequencies is rather “flat”. The distri-
bution related to the dynamics of the EDDy cipher suggests that for EDDy, the
above conclusion is certainly not appropriate.
integer numbers i. For effectively random sequences one would
expect to find each integer id with probability 2−n, hence the ex-
pected frequencies are simply given by ei = Nsamp×2−n wherein
Nsamp = M∆t. Now, if the encrypted configurations exhibit the
statistics of random binary sequences, the histogram {hi} should
be “flat” with each bin having the same expected frequency.
Consequently the null hypothesis reads: “The sample follows a
uniform distribution”. (ii) Probe the χ2 statistics, and, so as to
check the null-hypothesis compute the associated p-value, see
Ref. [17]. (iii) Finally, reject the hypothesis if p ≤ 0.01. I.e.,
if p > 0.01, the sample follows the assumption that the his-
togram is flat. The χ2-test described in steps (ii) and (iii) above
was carried out for N = 128-bit input sequences regarding four
different dynamics given by the EDDy, ExEDDy, and ReCA ci-
pher, as well as the R30 dynamics. In the analysis, ∆t = 103 and
blocks of n = 8 bits in length, i.e. bytes, where considered. The
results of the analysis are listed in Tab. 1 and probability density
functions (pdfs) for the ratio of the observed/expected frequen-
cies related to the four different dynamics are shown in Fig. 4.
To summarize the findings: while the configurations obtained
using the ExEDDy, ReCA, and R30 dynamics exhibit statistics
compatible with those of random sequences, the computed p-
values clearly suggest that EDDy gives rise to seemingly non-
random sequences of configurations during encryption.
An oversimplified compression test for the sequences of en-
coded states. Besides checking whether the sequence s(t) of
encrypted configurations exhibits the same statistics as truly
random sequences, it is also of interest to look for structural
regularities. As regards this, here, an oversimplified compres-
sion test using the convenient Unix-tool gzip is performed.
As a prerequisite for the test, for each of the three encryption
algorithms and the R30 dynamics, a number of 100 plaintext
messages (128 bits in length) is evolved for 103 iteration steps.
Again, R30 is considered for comparison only. The evolution
of each plaintext is stored in a single file. Prior to compression,
the individual files have a size of, say, B0 bits. The gzip data-
compression tool uses the Lempel-Ziv (LZ77) algorithm [18],
so as to reduce the size of the supplied data. Loosely speak-
ing, LZ77 works by finding sequences of data that are repeated
and exploits those “patterns” to perform the compression pro-
cess. After compression via gzip, the size of a given file is
reduced to Bgzip. Then, the compression factor κ = Bgzip/B0
for each file is computed and its mean and standard error are
listed in Tab. 1. As it appears, 〈κ〉 is approximately equal for
the ExEDDy, ReCA and R30 data, while it assumes a slightly
smaller value for the EDDy data. This indicates that, compared
to the other encryption schemes, EDDy exhibits a larger degree
of structural regularity.
A measure of the degree of randomness for the sequences of
encoded states. So as to elaborate on the degree of structural
regularity, data compression algorithms can also be used to esti-
mate further statistical properties of a given sequence x of sym-
bols. E.g., one might design a measure for the algorithmic ran-
domness associated to x via non-sequential recursive pair sub-
stitution (NSRPS) [19, 20, 21]. In order to illustrate the NSRPS
method, consider a sequence x0 of symbols, composed of char-
acters stemming from a finite q-symbol alphabet A = {ai}q−1i=0 .
An elementary step of the NSRPS algorithm, referred to as pair
substitution, might be illustrated as two step procedure: (i) For
a given sequence x0, determine the frequency of all (ordered)
pairs e ∈ A×A with respect to x0 and identify emfp, i.e. the most
frequent (ordered) pair of symbols. If the most frequent pair is
not unique, signify one of them as emfp. (ii) Construct a new
sequence x1 from x0 wherein each full pattern emfp is replaced
by a new symbol aq (for this purpose, x0 is scanned from left to
right), and augment A with aq. The new sequence is shorter in
length and the size of its associated alphabet is incremented by
1. This pair substitution step might be executed iteratively, un-
til the representation of the sequence requires a single character,
Table 1: From left to right: Type of dynamics, χ2/dof and p-values, resulting
from the n-block frequency analysis, compression factor κ obtained using a
simple data compression test, and minimal number Nps of pair substitution steps
needed to transform a sequence of bit states into a constant sequence. For the
latter quantity, the values in the braces list the standard deviation.
(χ2/dof, p)n=8 〈κ〉 〈Nps〉
EDDy (6.24, 10−197) 0.1378(4) 74(35)
ExEDDy (0.87, 0.93) 0.1714(7) 218(34)
ReCA (0.99, 0.53) 0.17365(9) 217(13)
R30 (0.87, 0.94) 0.17378(2) 225(4)
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Figure 5: Results for a repeated application of the pair substitution process
on bit strings, obtained by monitoring the states of the individual bits of a 128
bit plaintext message during an exemplary encryption process that took 103
encryption steps. Hence, there are 128 individual bit strings (corresponding to
the 128 lines in the figure), each of which is initially 103 symbols in length.
The figure shows the parameter Ci which might be used to indicate whether a
constant sequence is obtained during iteration (in that case, it holds that Ci = 0).
As discussed in the text, the application of the NSRPS algorithm allows to
define a measure of complexity associated to a given sequence of symbols.
only. Such a sequence has zero information entropy
H(x) = −
q−1∑
i=0
ni
N
log2
(ni
N
)
, (5)
wherein ni specifies the observed frequency of symbol ai in the
sequence x of length N, and is called a constant sequence. Here,
as a measure of algorithmic randomness associated to the initial
sequence x0, the minimal number of pair substitution steps Nps,
needed to transform x0 to a constant sequence with H(xNps ) = 0,
is considered. In order to facilitate intuition, consider the 6
bit sequence x = 110010. An iterative application of the pair
substitution step on x yields the result:
step i xi H(xi) emfp aq
0 110010 1.0 10 2
1 1202 1.5 02 3
2 123 1.58 23 4
3 14 1.0 14 5
4 5 0.0
I.e., after Nps = 4 steps, the NSRPS algorithm terminates for the
constant sequence x4 = 5. For the slightly different sequence
y = 101010 (also with initial entropy H(y0) = 1), the NSRPS
algorithm terminates after a single pair substitution step, where
the constant sequence reads y1 = 222. One may now conclude
0
216-1
0 216-1
Id
[s(
t+
1)]
Id[s(t)]
(a)
0 216-1
Id[s(t)]
(b)
Figure 6: Typical result for a graphical correlation analysis for subsequent
configurations s(t) and s(t + 1) obtained using the encryption dynamics based
on (a) EDDy, and (b) ExEDDy (using the same plaintext and key as (a)). In
the figure, a particular binary configuration s(t) is represented by means of its
integer decimal value Id[s(t)]. The results for the ReCA cipher look similar to
those of ExEDDy and are not shown.
that sequence x exhibits a higher degree of randomness than se-
quence y, since the NSRPS algorithm requires more elementary
pair substitution steps in order to arrive at a constant sequence.
This is in accord with intuition, since, in contrast to sequence
x, y shows a regular pattern.
In Fig. 5, results for a repeated application of the pair sub-
stitution process on 128 individual bit strings, each of which is
103 bits in length, are shown. The bit strings are obtained as
follows: a 128 bit plaintext is prepared and subsequently en-
crypted using 103 encryption steps. Each individual bit of the
plaintext is monitored during the encryption process so as to
yield a bit sequence that is 103 bits in length. More precise, the
figure illustrates the evolution of the parameter Ci = Li × H(xi)
for each of the 128 individual bit strings (each of which initially
is 103 symbols in length), wherein Li signifies the length of the
sequence at iteration step i. Results are shown for the EDDy
and ExEDDy ciphers, only. Upon execution of the NSRPS al-
gorithm, the parameter value Ci = 0 might be used as a stop-
ping criterion to detect whether a constant sequence is obtained
[21]. Here, the application of the NSRPS algorithm to each
bit string sheds some light on the “internal” dynamics of the
encryption schemes. Consider, e.g., the EDDy cipher: as ev-
ident from Fig. 5, there are some bit strings that transform to
constant ones almost immediately, while there are others that
last for quite a large number of iteration steps. The reason for
this has an intuitive appeal: during an encryption process using
EDDy, the dynamics of a given bit is only coupled to those bits
that are located along the same cycle in the cycle decomposi-
tion of the index-permutation P that forms part of the key (see
discussion below). Hence, the encryption dynamics of EDDy
for a plaintext of a given size can be decomposed into indepen-
dent dynamics taking place on the set of cycles in the cycle-
decomposition of P. Depending on the particular delay-times
that characterize the bits in such a cycle, the respective dynam-
ics might turn out to be rather regular. This can most easily be
seen for a fixed point pi = i of the permutation P: once the
dynamics si(t) = −si(max(0, t − τi)) is kicked off, the state of
the respective bit changes with period τi. For the simple case
6
where τi = 1, the sequence of the state of that particular bit
reads just 01010101 . . . (given that si(0) = 0), and the NSRPS
algorithm will terminate after a single step. Similarly, a delay
time τi = 2 might yield the sequence 00110011 . . ., keeping the
NSRPS algorithm busy for 3 steps. Somewhat “less regular”
patterns are found for cycles that are larger in length. Conse-
quently, a widespread distribution of the pair substitution steps
Nps, needed to obtain a constant sequence, is observed. The
average number of such pair substitution steps, taking into ac-
count 200 different 128 bit plaintexts, that where evolved for
103 iteration steps each, is listed in Tab. 1. The results for the
ExEDDy cipher are completely different: the fates of the indi-
vidual bit sequences upon application of the NSRPS algorithm
appear to be less diverse, see Fig. 5. In comparison to the results
obtained for EDDy, this is manifested by a smaller standard de-
viation associated to 〈Nps〉, as listed in Tab. 1. The results for
the ReCA cryptosystem and R30 dynamics are listed in Tab. 1,
also. They look similar to those obtained for ExEDDy and are
thus not shown.
Graphical analysis of correlations between successive encoded
states. One may further wonder whether the sequence s(t)
obtained during encryption exhibits correlations with respect
to, e.g., subsequent time steps. In order to check this, it is
most simple to label a configuration at a given time step t by
means of its integer decimal representation Id[s(t)] and to plot
Id[s(t + ∆t)] as function of Id[s(t)]. Such a graphical corre-
lation analysis for the evolution of one random 16 bit plaintext
message is illustrated in Fig. 6(a) and (b), following the encryp-
tion dynamics of the EDDy and ExEDDy ciphers, respectively.
Therein, the correlation between subsequent configurations, i.e.
∆t = 1, was considered. As evident from the figure, EDDy
exhibits a statistically rather regular behavior, which might be
attributed to its linear dynamics, whereas ExEDDy and ReCA
exhibit no obvious regularities for ∆t = 1 (the results for the
ReCA dynamics look similar to those of ExEDDy and are not
shown). Further, the regular pattern generated by EDDy sug-
gests a rather short cycle length for its dynamics.
3.2. Quantifying the avalanche parameter for the considered
ciphers
The avalanche criterion would require to check whether
〈dH(c, c(i))〉m,K ≈ 1/2 for each i ∈ (0, . . . , N − 1). Here, the
bits are thought of as equivalent entities, thus, in the remainder
of the presented section, only one flip for each plaintext is at-
tempted. This means, step (ii) above yields a modified plaintext
m′ (where the flipped bit is chosen uniformly at random), for
which c′ = FK(m′) and it is only checked whether 〈dH(c, c′)〉m,K
agrees with the desired value 1/2 within errorbars. If the latter
requirement is satisfied, the respective cipher is said to exhibit
the avalanche property. Subsequently, the Hammingdistance,
averaged over different plaintext messages m and keys K, i.e.
〈dH(c, c′)〉m,K , is referred to as avalanche parameter.
Evolution of the Hammingdistance upon modification of the
plaintext. Regarding the EDDy cipher, the Hammingdistance
〈dH(c, c′)〉m,K , interpreted as a function of the iteration steps
10-2
10-1
100
100 101 102
〈d H
(c,
c’)
〉 m,
K
t
N=32EDDyExEDDy
ReCA
Figure 7: Results for the Hamming-distance 〈dH(c, c′)〉m,K as function of the
number of iteration steps t, obtained for the different encryption algorithms.
t carried out by the encryption dynamics, fluctuates around
a value of N−1 for all considered plaintext lengths N. Fig.
7 illustrates the results at N = 32, where the distribution of
the distance-values 〈dH(c, c′)〉m,K , collected over an appropri-
ate number of iteration steps, follows a Gaussian distribution
with mean value µ(dH) ≈ 0.031 and width σ(dH) ≈ 0.001 (not
shown). The argument for such a small mean value is quite
plausible: Consider, e.g., a 6 bit plaintext, encrypted by using a
key containing the index-permutation P = (3, 4, 2, 0, 5, 1). The
respective cycle decomposition reads (2)(3, 0)(4, 5, 1). As a re-
sult, the ciphertext-bit c5 is only affected by a finite number
of plaintext-bits, namely bits m4 and m1. Now, if the value
of a single bit in the plaintext is changed, say m′5 = −m5,
the difference in the evolution of the altered plaintext will be
confined to the cycle (4, 5, 1) only. This is illustrated in Fig.
8(a), where the difference between two configurations c and
c′, i.e. c ⊕ c′, during an encryption process using EDDy is
monitored. Therein, the encryption processes was started at
two plaintexts that differed only in the value of the center bit.
In the analysis, if the flipped bit is chosen uniformly at ran-
dom, the length of the corresponding cycle is best fit by the
expression 〈ℓc〉 = 0.49(1)(N − 0.9(2))1.003(4) ≈ N/2 (where the
probability mass function for cycles with length ℓ behaves as
n(ℓ) ∝ ℓ−1, measured for permutations P of length N = 128;
not shown). Now, the length ℓc of a particular cycle sets an
upper bound for the Hammingdistance, giving rise to the re-
striction 〈dH(c, c′)〉m,K ≤ 1/2. Apparently, since the difference
c ⊕ c′ typically stems from only a small number of bits con-
tained in the respective cycle (see Fig. 8(a)), it appears that on
average [〈dH(c, c′)〉m,K]t ≈ N−1 for all N considered (see Fig. 9
and discussion below).
As evident from Fig. 7, the behavior of the ExEDDy cipher is
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(b)
(c) (d)
(a)
Figure 8: Exemplary plots that illustrate the evolution of the difference c ⊕ c′
between two ciphertexts c = fK (m) and c′ = fK (m′), where initially m and
m′ differed only in the value of the centered bit. Nonfilled squares signify
bits for which the values in the two configurations are different. Results for
encryption dynamics based on (a) EDDy, (b) ExEDDy (using the same key as
(a)), as well as (c) isotropic spread, and (d) anisotropic spread of the difference
obtained using the ReCA cipher. The length of the plaintext was N = 41 and
the evolution was followed over 40 iteration steps of the particular encryption
dynamics.
completely different: the Hammingdistance initially increases
but saturates at a value slightly below 1/2. Related to this, Fig.
8(b) illustrates the difference between two configurations that
initially differed only in the value of the center bit. Considering
a CA with a neighborhood of radius r = 2, an initial change
in plaintext, i.e. at time t = 0, may affect at most 2rt + 1 cells
at time t, implying that dH ≤ (2rt + 1)/N. Therein, the value
of r defines an intrinsic “velocity”, measuring the number of
cells per time-step, by means of which a change is transmit-
ted through the CA array. However, note that this is merely an
upper bound, the actual velocity depends on the precise updat-
ing rule implemented by the CA and might also be anisotropic
(cf. rules 30 and 60 for elementary cellular automata [22]). To
illustrate this, Figs. 8(c),(d) show the difference between two
configurations that initially differed only in the value of the bit
at the center, based on the ReCA cipher. Then, for the ReCA
dynamics one can expect an approximate linear increase of dH
during the initial stage of the encryption dynamics. In deed, a
fit using a functional form 〈dH(c, c′)〉m,K = (u · t + 1)/N yields
the result u = 1.112(1) at N = 256. Analysis of the initial
dynamics for further plaintext lengths N = 4, . . . , 512 yield
qualitatively similar results (not shown). Hence, after t ≈ N/2
time steps a change of one bit in plaintext leads to a distance
〈dH(c, c′)〉m,K ≈ 1/2 between the ciphertext corresponding to
the perturbed/non-perturbed initial message, see Fig. 7. This
finding compares well to the observation reported in Ref. [6],
where for a r = 2 CA with 32 (64) cells a minimum number
0.01
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Figure 9: Avalanche parameter resulting from a flip of a single plaintext bit as
a function of the plaintext bit-length N. Nonfilled symbols indicate an average
over the full input alphabet, while the filled symbols refer to a stochastic sam-
pling of plaintext messages. Error bars display the standard error associated to
the data points. The inset shows a zoom in on the ExEDDy and ReCA results
for small plaintext lengths.
of 19 (38) iterations of the encryption dynamics was recom-
mended.
Stationary behavior of the avalanche parameter. So as to quan-
tify the stationary behavior of the avalanche parameter, it is
useful to distinguish the kind of modification imposed on the
encryption process. In this regard, the presented analysis dis-
tinguishes between (i) a modification of the plaintext, where a
single bit of the plaintext is changed (the bit is chosen uniformly
at random), and (ii) a modification of the key. In the latter case,
the focus is on the EDDy/ExEDDy ciphers only.
As regards (i), the avalanche parameter for the EDDy cipher
(averaged over the iteration steps t) shows the clear scaling be-
havior [〈dH(c, c′)〉m,K]t ∝ N−1 for the full range of the consid-
ered plaintext bit-lengths N, see Fig. 9. This is in accord with
the observation above, where the evolution of the Hammingdis-
tance during an encryption process was considered. The behav-
ior of the ExEDDy cipher is strikingly different: the value of
the avalanche parameter, averaged over iteration steps t ≥ 200,
is only slightly smaller than 1/2, see Fig. 9. E.g., the numerical
value [〈dH(c, c′)〉m,K]t = 0.482(5) attained at N = 32 is only 3.5
standard deviations below the desired value. Given the apparent
similarity of the two encryption schemes, this is a considerable
improvement over EDDy. The ReCA based cipher appears to
yield the best results: while there are slight deviations from the
desired value for small plaintext sizes N < 9 (e.g., at N = 8 the
numerical value [〈dH(c, c′)〉m,K]t = 0.496(2) of the avalanche
parameter is 2 standard deviations below 1/2) the value of the
avalanche parameter is compatible with 1/2 for all values N =
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Figure 10: Avalanche parameter resulting from swapping two entries of the
index-permutation P (illustrated by the main plot), and choosing a bit (uni-
formly at random) and replacing its associated delay-time by a new one (shown
in the inset). The abscissa indicates the length N of the plaintext. Nonfilled
symbols indicate an average over the full input alphabet, while the filled sym-
bols refer to a stochastic sampling of plaintext messages. Error bars display the
standard error associated to the data points (for the filled symbols, the symbol
size is larger than the error bars). The solid horizontal line indicates a value of
[〈dH(c, c′)〉m,K ]t = 1/2.
9 . . . 64 (e.g., at N = 64 one finds [〈dH(c, c′)〉m,K]t = 0.498(3)).
The results for the ReCA cipher where averaged over iteration
steps t ≥ 350.
Considering a modification of the key and focusing on the
EDDy and ExEDDy cryptosystems, a further distinction is
drawn between altering the permutation P and the delay-time
vector τ. Regarding the former modification, two randomly
chosen entries are swapped, while in the latter case a single
bit is chosen uniformly at random and the associated delay time
is redrawn from the interval [1, τmax]. In both cases, the re-
sults for the EDDy cipher are best fit by powerlaw functions of
the form [〈dH(c, c′)〉m,K]t ∝ (N + ∆N)a, where ∆N ≈ 265 and
a = −1.29(6) for a change in P, see Fig. 10, and ∆N ≈ 65 and
a = −1.09(3) for a change in τ, see inset of Fig. 10. Conse-
quently, in the limit of large N, the effect of a minimal change
in the plaintext on the ciphertext is negligible. The precise nu-
merical values of [〈dH(c, c′)〉m,K]t in the range N = 24 . . .2048
are about 2 − 5 standard deviations below 1/2.
For ExEDDy, however, results are completely different: upon
swapping two random entries of the index-permutation, the
avalanche parameter (averaged over iteration steps t ≥ 200) is
only slightly below 1/2, see Figs. 10. As regards this, the nu-
merical values of [〈dH(c, c′)〉m,K]t in the range N = 24 . . .2048
are about 2−5 standard deviations below 1/2. Further, changing
one randomly chosen delay-time yields an avalanche parameter
(averaged over the data for t ≥ 200) clearly smaller than 1/2,
see inset of Fig. 10. In conclusion, a modification of plaintext
or index permutation leads to quite similar numerical values for
the associated avalanche parameters. In comparison, a modi-
fication of a randomly chosen delay time results in somewhat
smaller values of the avalanche parameter.
3.3. A note on completeness
As pointed out above, the encryption dynamics of EDDy for
a plaintext of a given size can be decomposed into indepen-
dent dynamics taking place on the set of cycles in the cycle-
decomposition of P. As a result, the dynamics of a given bit
is only coupled to those bits that are located in the same cy-
cle of the cycle decomposition. This means that typically, a
given ciphertext bit depends on a few plaintext bits only. Thus,
the linear dynamics provided by EDDy lacks completeness (as
explained in the introduction). The situation is different for
ExEDDy: since each bit depends on the sum of states of all
bits in the previous time step, completeness is trivially satisfied.
Also, if the dynamics of the ReCA encryption algorithm is iter-
ated for tmin ' N/2 time-steps, each bit in ciphertext might be
affected by a given bit in the plaintext message. Note that this
argument was established from a statistical point of view (as
discussed above), the precise value of tmin depends on the par-
ticular key used during the encryption process. Further, bear in
mind that, as discussed above, a lower bound on the respective
time scale for a r = 2 CA is given by t = N/4. Hence, ReCA
exhibits completeness after a certain (key dependent) minimal
number of time-steps.
4. Conclusions
In the presented article, the encryption process of three dif-
ferent cryptosystems for block-encryption, i.e. EDDy, ExEDDy
(an extended variant of EDDy) and ReCA, is put under scrutiny.
While EDDy and ExEDDy are based on the paradigm of de-
layed dynamics, ReCA relies on the updating rules provided
by reversible cellular automata. Starting from an initial plain-
text message, all three cryptographic schemes iteratively pro-
cess the plaintext, yielding a sequence of encoded configura-
tions until, finally, the ciphertext is obtained. Upon analysis
of the statistical properties related to the sequence of encoded
configurations, it was found that the EDDy cipher gives rise to
a statistically rather regular behavior: the sequence of encoded
configurations does not exhibit the properties expected for ef-
fectively random sequences. For the purpose of comparison,
effectively random binary sequences produced by a certain 1d
CA, referred to as R30, were considered. Further, EDDy does
not satisfy the avalanche criterion (neither for a modification of
plaintext nor a modification of the key) and it lacks complete-
ness. In contrast to this, the ExEDDy cipher clearly outper-
forms EDDy in all test considered. The statistical properties of
the sequence of encoded configurations are in good agreement
with those of the ReCA cipher and the R30 dynamics. ExEDDy
does not strictly satisfy the avalanche criterion but performs
reasonably well. Further, it features completeness. Given the
apparent similarity of the algorithmic procedures that underlie
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both delayed-dynamics based ciphers, ExEDDy constitutes a
striking improvement over EDDy. Finally, the statistical prop-
erties of the sequences of encoded configurations that are ob-
tained during an encryption process using the ReCA cipher are
in excellent agreement with those obtained for the R30 dynam-
ics. From the analysis of plaintexts with bit-size N = 4 . . .64 it
is obvious that ReCA satisfies the avalanche criterion (in sup-
port of Ref. [6], where 32 and 64-bit plaintexts are considered
only). Further, the ReCA cipher shows completeness after a
key-dependent minimal number of iteration steps.
Another issue of interest from a point of view of application
is the size of the full ciphertext, relative to the plaintext. As
regards this, the three cryptosystems considered here lead to
data expansion. As pointed out in subsect. 2.1, the key space of
the delayed dynamics based cryptosystems increases with the
maximal delay time as ∝ (τmax)N , ensuring a high level of se-
curity for large τmax. However, note the flipside to that coin:
the minimal size of the full ciphertext that is necessary for de-
cryption increases as (τmax + 1) × N and thus depends on the
parameter τmax as part of the key. In contrast to the delayed
dynamics ciphers, the size of the full ciphertext for the ReCA
cryptosystem is always 2 × N. To the knowledge of the author,
the cryptographic schemes discussed in the presented article are
of academic interest. The respective encryption dynamics are
goverend by rather basic model dynamics that, without doubt,
are interesting in their own right since they give rise to a very
complex behavior and eventually exhibit properties that can be
exploited so as to set up a working encryption algorithm. How-
ever, so as to implement a full cryptographic method that allows
for encryption and decryption of data, a rather large key is nec-
essary and the ciphertext may turn out to be considerably larger
in size than the plaintext (also known as data expansion). These
effects somehow limit the practicabillity of the discussed cryp-
tographic schemes.
Acknowledgment
OM would like to thank C. Norrenbrock and A. K. Hartmann
for critically reading the manuscript. Further, OM acknowl-
edges financial support from the DFG (Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft) under grant HA3169/3-1. The simulations were
performed at the GOLEM I cluster for scientific computing at
the University of Oldenburg (Germany).
References
[1] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, S. A. Vanstone, Handbook
of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, 1997. Available online at
http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/.
[2] S. Wolfram, Cryptography with Cellular Automata, in: H. C. Williams
(Ed.), Advances in Cryptography – CRYPTO ’85, LNCS 218, Springer,
Berlin, 1985, pp. 429–432.
[3] M. S. Baptista, Cryptography with chaos, Phys. Lett. A 240 (1998) 50–
54.
[4] T. Ohira, Extended Encryption Model with Delayed Dynamics, in:
JWIS98, Singapore, pp. 21–26.
[5] T. Ohira, Encryption with delayed dynamics, Comp. Phys. Comm. 121–
122 (1999) 54–56. A summary of this article is available at papercore.org,
see http://www.papercore.org/Ohira1999.
[6] M. Seredynski, P. Bouvry, Block Encryption Using Reversible Cellular
Automata, in: P. M. A. Sloot, B. Chopard, A. G. Hoekstra (Eds.), ACRI
2004, LNCS 3305, Springer, Berlin, 2004, pp. 785–792.
[7] H. Feistel, Cryptography and Computer Privacy, Scientific American 228
(1973) 15–23.
[8] Papercore, 2009. Papercore is a free and open access database for sum-
maries of scientific (currently mainly physics) papers. For a summary of
the presented article see http://www.papercore.org/Melchert2011c.
[9] S. Hayes, C. Grebogi, E. Ott, A. Mark, Experimental control of chaos for
communication, Phys. Rev. Lett. 73 (1994) 1781–1784.
[10] E. Alvarez, A. Ferna´ndez, P. Garcı´a, J. Jime´nez, A. Marcano, New ap-
proach to chaotic encryption, Phys. Lett. A 263 (1999) 373–375.
[11] G. Y. Vichniac, Simulating physics with cellular automata, Physica D 10
(1984) 96–116.
[12] S. Takesue, Reversible Cellular Automata and Statistical Mechanics,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 59 (1987) 2499–2502.
[13] S. Wolfram, Statistical mechanics of cellular automata, Rev. Mod. Phys.
55 (1983) 601–644.
[14] S. Wolfram, Origins of randomness in physical systems, Phys. Rev. Lett.
55 (1985) 449–452.
[15] NIST, A Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudoran-
dom Number Generators for Cryptographic Applications,
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html, 2010. Special Publi-
cation 800-22 1a.
[16] S. Wolfram, Random Sequence Generation by Cellular Automata, Adv.
Appl. Math. 7 (1986) 123–169.
[17] A. K. Hartmann, Practical Guide to Computer Simulations, World Scien-
tific, Singapore, 2009.
[18] J. Ziv, A. Lempel, A Universal Algorithm for Sequential Data Compres-
sion, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theor. 23 (1977) 337–343.
[19] M. A. Jimenez-Montano, W. Ebeling, T. Poeschel, SYNTAX: A computer
program to compress a sequence and to estimate its information content,
2002. (preprint).
[20] D. Benedetto, E. Caglioti, D. Gabrielli, Non-sequential recursive pair
substitution: some rigorous results, J. Stat. Mech. (2006) P09011.
[21] N. Nagaraj, M. S. Kavalekalam, A. Venugopal, N. Krishnan, Loss-
less Compression and Complexity of Chaotic Sequences, 2011.
(preprint) A summary of this article is available at papercore.org, see
http://www.papercore.org/Nagaraj2011.
[22] E. W. Weisstein, Elementary Cellular Automaton,
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/ElementaryCellularAutomaton.html,
2006. From MathWorld–A Worlfram web resource.
10
